the United States Supreme Court that have quite reasonably looked at the citizenship capacity of the targeted group, finding the presence of such capacity to increase the likelihood that the group deserves heightened protection from the Court. 14 The present article turns Scalia's reasoning inside out. To begin, the existence of a political movement of, by, and for a minority group necessarily indicates that the members of that minority see themselves as suffering some sort of discrimination. Whether the identity category is race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or some other, the problem remains: how to decide if the majority's choice to discriminate against the minority is valid? Or, how to decide if the minority's grievance is legitimate? One answer to that question takes the form of another question: why else would members of the minority group invest precious resources in a political movement? Why would thousands of struggling African Americans send their mites every month to the NAACP unless they saw themselves as suffering some oppression and they hoped that the NAACP would help them fight it? 15 This question by itself does not settle the issue. Members of the majority who wish to discriminate will no doubt respond that political protest against discrimination just proves how misguided the members of the minority group really are. 16 The existence of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People did not often lead white supremacists to see the error of their ways. Instead, it produced denunciations from white supremacists, who 14 See infra, note 84ff and accompanying text. 15 . 20 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 403, 404 (1857): "Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in cases specified in the Constitution…. The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States." 21 U.S. Const., amend. I: "Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." N.Y. Times v. Sullivan. See also discussion of Roth v. United States, infra.
Halley focused primarily on the social-psychological process of forming lesbian/gay identities. This article will focus primarily on the historical evidence demonstrating the political engagement of lesbians and gay men in opposition to their own oppression. In both cases, the emphasis is on the importance of the political process, and of equal access to it, as a component for evaluating the legitimacy of law and policy in the United States. That LGBT persons continue to suffer significant discrimination in spite of their determined participation in the political process is all the evidence one needs to justify increased judicial scrutiny of such discrimination under the equal protection clause.
The key point is that
LGBT identity in the United States is inherently political.
LGBT persons necessarily formulate not only their political movement and its organizations, but their very identities as individuals, in response to external political pressures. The attempt to deny the fundamentally political character of identity formation -to insist that LGBT identity is solely a matter of conduct or mental illness, 26 to reify race and gender as biological characteristics, rather than political choices 27 -is itself part of the political move. Oppressors strive to avoid recognizing that they are oppressors by shifting the causation for oppression from themselves to the oppressed. Insofar as we define "politics" as a purely public enterprise of choosing elected officials and having them make laws, it is simple to suggest that individual identity characteristics are not political.
But
LGBT identity would not exist in its present form absent substantial stress around issues of gender and sexuality that is plainly political in a much broader sense. 28 famous now is that it contains "the most celebrated footnote in American Law," 34 Footnote Four.
This footnote is important because it lays out the doctrinal basis by which the Court expects to distinguish in the future which classifications it will examine minimally under the Equal Protection Clause, and which it will examine closely for evidence of discriminatory intent or effect.
I have no wish to dispute the prevailing version of the story. I do wish to complicate the story by noting that the analysis in Footnote Four treats minority groups as inherently distinct and self-existing, failing largely to appreciate the role of politics in creating "minority" groups in the first place. The primary articulations of equal protection doctrine as requiring the invalidation of specific statutes aimed at LGBT persons similarly treat LGBT persons as entities apart from the political process who happened to get caught up in it. 35 A deeper appreciation of the necessarily political character of LGBT identity points us to a different precedent, a First Amendment precedent, 36 that addresses the political process directly, and the active use LGBT person have made of that process over the past fifty years, rather than in terms of apparently epiphenomenal effects on otherwise unpolitical events.
As part of this increased complication, I want to remind us of the case that is perhaps the most important ever in the history of the LGBT civil rights movement, and today largely 1985) . In this case, the court upheld in part, and struck down in part, a state statute that provided for firing or other adverse employment action for any public school teacher who "engaged in public homosexual conduct or activity." The statute defined "public homosexual activity" as any violation of the state sodomy statute "a. committed with a person of the same sex, and b. indiscreet and not practiced in private." It defined "public homosexual conduct" as "advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting public or private homosexual activity in a manner that creates a substantial risk that such conduct will come to the attention of school children or school employees." Not surprisingly, the court had no trouble finding that states could legitimately fire public school teachers who engaged in public same-sex sex (and presumably they would also fire any teacher who engaged in public opposite-sex sex, statute or no, but their failure to do so would create an interesting basis for a challenge. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down facially neutral statute as discriminatorily applied to Chinese owners of laundries)). But the court also had no trouble finding that the prohibition on "public homosexual conduct" was "overbroad" for purposes of the First Amendment; "we must be especially willing to invalidate a statute for facial overbreadth when, as here, the statute regulates 'pure speech. In the future, however, it seems clear that the types of issues LGBT activists will want to raise -especially the right to marriage for same-sex couples, and the right to military servicewill lend themselves more to the equal protection argument than to the due process Following Halley, we should start our history of equal protection doctrine with United States v.
49 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75. 50 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at n.2, where the Court ratifies the trial court's decision to dismiss a heterosexual couple from the challenge to the sodomy statute because they lacked standing. According to the trial court, the heterosexual couple was in no danger of having the law enforced against them. This, of course, is a clear admission that the issue is a status distinction -different types of persons engage in the same prohibited conduct, with one type potentially subject to arrest, while the other type can rest safe in knowing that they will never be subject to arrest. This fact was so obvious and reasonable to five members of the Supreme Court that they endorsed it without discussion. 51 Id. at 584-85: "I am confident, however, that so long as the Equal Protection Clause requires a sodomy law to apply equally to the private consensual conduct of homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, such a law would not long stand in our democratic society." As the majority noted, id. at 570, only nine states ever enacted sodomy statutes directed only at same-sex couples. All others were facially neutral, including statutes that existed at the time of the Lawrence decision. 52 As Kennedy points out in his opinion, only nine states ever had same-sex-specific sodomy statutes. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570.
the analysis that O'Connor laid out in her Lawrence concurrence.
A. Carolene Products
It is helpful to have the full text of Footnote Four from Carolene Products to refer to:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities; whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. two -that legislation targeting minorities is but a form of interference in the ordinary functioning of the political process. Not, however, if we recall James Madison's analysis in Federalist #10.
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Madison deplored "democracy," by which he meant simple majority rule. His chief concern about democracy as he defined it was that he considered it inevitable that majorities, however defined, would eventually engage in tyranny over minorities, however defined, with a resulting No system is perfect. Obviously, Madison's Constitution completely failed for seventysix years to prevent the white majority from enslaving the black minority, and it failed for another one hundred years after that -despite substantial modifications -to prevent the white majority from segregating and otherwise oppressing the black minority. imperative. 59 We still have no Archimidean point from which to assert definitively that one position is correct and the other is incorrect. This was the dispute in Romer v. Evans -the majority saw prejudice, or "animus," as they chose to put it, while Scalia saw only ordinary citizens perpetuating their preferences in matters of sexual morality. 60 One way to solve this problem is through the use of the political process -majorities get to decide what constitutes a moral imperative. Or, we could strive to ensure that all self-identified minorities have real access to the political process to defend their own interests.
Scalia's position in Romer invites reiteration of Halley's point: he claims that he would simply leave determination of lesbian/gay rights issues to the operation of the political process.
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Unlike the Bowers court, Scalia was plainly cognizant of the very tradition of equal protection analysis that he believed should not apply in this instance, although he carefully avoided all mention of that tradition in his dissent. He did, however, gin up evidence to support his contention that lesbians and gay men exerted disproportionate political influence, at least at the local level, and that the lesbian/gay rights ordinances that Amendment 2 repealed were the result 58 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632: Amendment 2's "sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests"; U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973): "if the constitutional conception of "equal protection of the laws" means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." Emphasis in original. 59 Romer, 517 U.S. at 653 (Scalia dissenting): "Amendment 2 is designed to prevent piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of Coloradans, and is not only an appropriate means to that legitimate end, but a means that Americans have employed before." Lawrence, U.S. at 602 (Scalia dissenting): "Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this as protecting themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive. The Court views it as 'discrimination' which it is the function of our judgments to deter." See also, Nan D. Hunter, Proportional Equality: Readings of Romer, 89 KY. L. J. 885 (2000-2001) , describing "the unresolved animus/morality dichotomy." 60 Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia dissenting): "The constitutional amendment before us here is not the manifestation of a "'bare . . . desire to harm'" homosexuals, ante, at 634, but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws." 61 Supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.
uncanny how his argument in Romer attempted to address Halley's argument about the Court's duty to protect a minority group in the political process if the Court plans to leave that minority to the political process. According to Scalia, this particular minority -lesbians and gay menneeds no protection from the judiciary because they already have all the political power they deserve and then some.
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B. The LGBT Minority: Diffuse and Indiscrete
Halley rehearses Bruce Ackerman's observations about why "discrete and insular" minorities, in the language of Footnote Four, may not be the most vulnerable. 64 Lesbians and gay men are perhaps the paradigm case of this point. Ackerman notes that discrete and insular minorities can more readily apply pressure to individuals in order to minimize free-riding, and they are more likely to be highly concentrated geographically, increasing their chances of electing one of their own so long as they have the same voting rights as the majority. They also have lower costs of organizing insofar as they are already concentrated.
65 62 Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-47 (Scalia dissenting). We have no way of knowing if Scalia failed to notice the contradiction inherent in his position, or he just hoped no one else would notice. The contradiction is that, on the one hand, he goes to great lengths to insist that common sexual conduct is all that defines lesbian, gay, and bisexual identity, but he then talks about the supposed disproportionate political power of LGB persons. It is theoretically possible that one could define a political group solely on the basis of a shared interest in a particular sexual activity, but I know of no examples in which this has happened. This is my point about the National Masturbators' Task Force -the reason why that organization does not exist when the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force has existed for 35 years is that LGBT persons have a minority identity apart from sex. The inclusion of transgender persons in the movement proves the point -the issue for transgender persons has nothing to do with sex per se. Transgender persons feel some sort of profound disconnect between their sexual anatomy and their gender identity, and/or they see constraints on their gender expression as completely unjustified. Should a woman who chooses not to shave her beard really suffer discrimination in employment, or in any other area of life? I'm sure I cannot see why. It may be that, at this stage in the history of the world, women who choose not to shave their beards are also more likely to be lesbians, but I would suggest that this is simply a reflection of heterosexual supremacy. If heterosexual women felt comfortable letting their beards grow -if they did not live with the constant barrage of words and images telling them that their highest calling in life is to make themselves attractive to men -they might well do so more often. 63 various examples of legislators acting to protect the mentally retarded, the Court still found in this instance that the municipal officials of Cleburne, Texas were picking on the mentally retarded. The answer, of course, is simple: White's legislative examples reflect the prevailing approach to the mentally retarded, while the City of Cleburne reflects a minority approach, and an unconstitutional one at that. The problem is not just ability to participate in the political process, but also evidence that the majority is actually picking on the relatively powerless minority. 81 It is important to note that White's discussion of this point came during the section in which he considered whether the mentally retarded should have "quasi-suspect" class status, as women do, in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence.
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The Court held that they should not, expressing the concern, inter alia, that putting the mentally retarded in such a classification might actually make it harder to enact legislation benefiting them, as well as legislation harming them. 83 In making his argument, White appealed to examples of legislation benefiting the mentally retarded, but he also noted that the mentally retarded typically exhibit characteristics that are genuinely relevant to their ability to function fully as citizens. 84 
D. Are LGBT Persons Necessarily Deficient Citizens?
On the basis of Cleburne, two key issues exist: 1) is the majority picking on the minority;
and 2) do members of the minority group suffer deficiencies in their ability to function as citizens? Whether the electoral majority was picking on lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons with Amendment 2 was the debate in Romer, with the Court majority saying they were and the dissenters saying they were not. Lacking any Archimedean point from which to establish definitively what is "picking on" and what is "upholding legitimate moral standards," we can appeal to the second criterion, ability to function as citizens.
Conservatives implicitly take the position that LGBT persons lack the ability to make LGBT persons have a high degree of autonomous political participation, unlike the mentally retarded. On the other hand, it is clearly the case that LGBT persons have suffered a number of highly adverse legislative outcomes over the past twenty years, mostly with respect to legal recognition for same-sex marriages, but in other areas as well. 91 These losses reflect nothing other than the prejudice of the majority -heterosexual supremacy.
It is also the case that these legislative failures reflect an ongoing history of discrimination starting roughly in the late nineteenth century, when self-styled experts in Europe and the United States first articulated the notion of "homosexuals" as a distinct class of persons. 92 Indeed, it may be that powerlessness is not so much the criterion as unpopularity.
Most people choose not to pick on persons who are both powerless and popular, city leaders of Cleburne, Texas to the contrary notwithstanding. Rather, they pick on people who are 89 Romer, 520 U.S. at 636 (Scalia dissenting). Scalia nowhere makes exactly this point in his dissent, but he does attribute political power to LGBT persons, id. at 645-46, and he acknowledges that Amendment 2 does target LGB persons, even if he denies that it even "disfavors" them, id. at 653. 90 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579, 580 (O'Connor concurring). 91 See, e.g., Rumfeld v. FAIR (upholding against constitutional challenge a statute that requires law schools to provide the same access to military job recruiters as to all others or face loss of entire classes of federal funds). 92 See sources at supra note 28. unpopular, and whom they perceive to be easy targets. They may find out that the target is not as easy as they thought, but that is a separate matter.
And this is all the equal protection clause does: where a majority has imposed a disability on a minority, the equal protection clause simply asks if the majority can provide some motive other than hostility toward the minority. The other case that O'Connor cited more than once in her Lawrence concurrence was Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, which is another classic case of picking on -the Department adopted a specific regulation in order to minimize the access of hippies to the federal food stamp program. 93 The Court struck the regulation down. 94 An important case on this point that often gets overlooks is Palmore v. Sidoti, where the Court reversed a trial court decision granting custody of a child to the father solely because the mother had married a black man. 95 The Palmore Court put the point very well: "The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."
96
E. Non-Marital Children
The other instructive place to look is the court's cases regarding non-marital children.
This is an area that lesbians and gay men should pay attention to given the proliferation of nonmarital children that same-sex couples are busy producing at this moment. 97 More importantly for present purposes, it is also an area of the law where the debate is strikingly similar to that over lesbian/gay civil rights -should non-marital children suffer social stigma and legal disabilities purely as a reflection of the community's moral sentiment? It is also an interesting ) ; Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (upholding against equal protection and due process challenges a Louisiana statute excluding non-marital children from taking in intestacy unless the father legally acknowledge paternity); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (striking down on equal protection grounds Louisiana statute that prohibited mother from filing wrongful death suit at death of her non-marital child). 107 476 U.S. 852 (1986). 108 Id. at 854-55. 109 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586ff (Scalia dissenting).
the Supreme Court's opinion in Trimble v. Gordon, which squarely held that the practice of preventing non-marital children from inheriting in intestacy unless their parents had subsequently married was unconstitutional. In Reed, the state court held that the plaintiff was ineligible to inherit under such a rule, and that it had no responsibility to apply the holding of Trimble retroactively. The Supreme Court could see no rational basis for refusing to apply Trimble retroactively.
Interestingly, the Court consistently refused to find that non-marital children constitute a suspect, or even a quasi-suspect, classification for purposes of equal protection analysis. They did their work on behalf of non-marital children using rational basis review. In Mathews v.
Lucas, the Court wrote, It is true, of course, that the legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society. The Court recognized in Weber that visiting condemnation upon the child in order to express society's disapproval of the parents' liaisons "is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual -as well as unjust -way of deterring the parent."
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Part of the problem, as this passage demonstrates, is that every time the Court articulates the point, even when it quotes itself, it still comes up with a slightly different formulation.
The other important difference between non-marital children and LGBT persons, as the quotation above from Reed v. Campbell indicates, 111 is that the courts have found legitimate reasons to allow the use of the marital/non-marital distinction, especially where the state can show a legitimate concern for fraud. Non-marital children may in some instances operate under increased burdens of proof. 112 One of the claims of this article is that no legislative classifications based on sexual orientation are rational. But the underlying point is that the courts have been quite thoughtful in their willingness to evaluate the actual circumstances that the cases of non-marital children present, and they have achieved a reasonable, consistent balance between the rights of non-marital children and the legitimate administrative needs of government.
Thus, multiple avenues exist under equal protection analysis for demonstrating why courts in the United States should routinely look with considerable suspicion on the use of sexual orientation (and gender identity) in legislative classifications. This is pretty standard stuff. The next section of this article offers an argument that may strike many as highly counterintuitivethat LGBT persons have long benefited, and continue to benefit, from essential First Amendment protections.
II. First Amendment Doctrine
It might seem odd at this moment to offer First Amendment doctrine as a source of
LGBT civil rights. First Amendment right to free speech.
Some
LGBT activists deplored this decision, but it seems obvious that organizers of
LGBT Pride parades can deploy it to exclude Klansmen or "ex-gay" groups from their parades. sodomy statutes to take place in the majoritarian process, then it had the responsibility to protect the ability of persons who suffer from the existence of sodomy statutes to participate fully in that process. She is undoubtedly right, although one supposes she was also disingenuous in that particular article in that she could not really have expected the Court to act on her reasoning.
The trickier claim is the one that goes the other way: given the Court's demonstrated willingness to defend the First Amendment rights of lesbians and gay men, it also had the responsibility to strike down sodomy laws on political process grounds, because the mere existence of sodomy laws impaired the willingness and ability of many lesbians and gay men to participate in the political process as lesbians and gay men, that is, on their own behalf.
Unexpectedly, if not perversely, I will here embrace wholeheartedly Scalia's proposition that certain sexual acts define lesbians and gay men as a class. At the level of the society as a whole, this is an accurate claim, even if it is empirically false. That is, given that most people falsely associate sodomy only with lesbians and gay men, the fact of heterosexual sodomy becomes invisible, and sodomy does in fact come to define lesbians and gay men as a class. What is the rational basis for prohibiting masturbation? According to Scalia, it is the interest in perpetuating the majority's preferences regarding matters of sexual morality. But such preferences almost automatically become a potential site for vigorous social and political debate -unless anyone who occupies one position in the debate immediately becomes subject to significant stigma, in which case virtually no one will publicly defend that position. It is almost impossible in the United States even now to take a public position in support of LGBT civil rights without creating in the minds of some significant percentage of observers that one is
LGBT. 153 Thanks to substantial political activism by lesbians and gay men and their supporters, the stigma associated with lesbian/gay identity has decreased significantly in recent years. Hanks in a suit complaining that his firm fired him for having AIDS, Denzel Washington gets propositioned by another man in a grocery store. What makes this a particularly interesting example is that Washington in this instance is not even litigating a lesbian/gay civil rights claim per se -he is litigating an AIDS discrimination claim, but such are the strengths of the associations involved that representation of a client with AIDS is sufficient to create the assumption that one is lesbian/gay. Note also that the person making the assumption in this instance is himself a gay man. 154 
Conclusion
It is possible to enact significant regulations on sexual activity in the name of health and safety concerns. To suggest, however, as Scalia does, that the majority's moral preferences simpliciter is a rational basis for legislation is to give the majority an unfettered power to impose stigma as it likes on unpopular minorities. One may try to insist that I must at least cabin this assertion to read, "on unpopular sexual minorities," but it is easy to demonstrate that claims of incorrigible sexual irresponsibility by African Americans were a set-piece of white supremacy.
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This fact alone buttresses the case for heightened judicial scrutiny of sexual-orientation classifications because it demonstrates that our nation has a clear history of using attributions of sexual immorality for the primary purpose of perpetuating stigma and discrimination. We now tend to focus in antidiscrimination law on the identities of the victims of discrimination, which is reasonable on its own terms. However, the obvious differences between race and sexual orientation as characteristics of human identity make it all too easy to overlook the fact that the reasoning of white supremacy is no different from the reasoning of heterosexual supremacy.
Racism in the United States was (is) all about sex.
Perhaps the best way to evaluate claims of discrimination is to listen carefully to those who suffer from the disability. Of course the Court should evaluate such claims in light of empirical evidence, but this is only to say that the Court should be a court. claims of discrimination effectively, they must have the same access to the public debate as everyone else. Again, LGBT persons have spent nearly the past sixty years battling discrimination against them, with some notable successes, and some notable setbacks. But in terms of ensuring a fair political process, the important thing is not any group's win/loss record.
The important thing is who chooses to show up and play the game.
